MUNICIPAL BONDAGE: THE UNDISCLOSED DISCLOSURE
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Abstract
The municipal securities market has recently become the target of increased
regulatory scrutiny. Once considered a “sleepy market,” the market is now burdened
by new regulations, increased oversight, and heightened enforcement, which place
direct disclosure obligations on municipal securities issuers. As such, the clear
provisions of the 1975 Tower Amendment, which limit regulation of the municipal
securities market to anti-fraud actions, have been cut off at all corners.
This Article examines the fundamental discord between regulating the
municipal securities market with the same structure and intensity as the corporate
securities market. This Article proposes limiting the reach of federal regulatory
bodies on the municipal securities market because of the harmful and unnecessary
impacts caused by overbroad regulatory actions. To subdue these harms, this Article
ultimately suggests that registration and disclosure requirements place undue
burdens on municipal issuers and their counterparts, and that regulatory bodies
should be limited to controlling municipal securities through anti-fraud actions.
I. Introduction
There are at least 3.67 trillion reasons why the municipal securities market
shines brightly on the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”)
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regulatory radar.1 California,2 Detroit,3 and Puerto Rico4 all provide notorious casesin-point for why public investments may no longer be such a safe bet, and why the
fiscal stability of governments deserves intensified scrutiny in the regulatory realm.
And intense it has become. In the last five years, the municipal securities market has
found itself the target of an unprecedented amount of new regulations, strict
oversight, and heightened enforcement actions.
This Article is about those increased regulatory burdens on the municipal
securities market, why those burdens are undue because of municipal securities’
dissonance from traditional corporate securities, and the need to better harmonize
regulation with reality. This Article offers the first-ever sustained examination of the
recent regulatory burdens on the municipal securities market, highlights the serious
flaws in the traditional approaches to financial regulation as applied to the municipal
securities market, and ultimately proposes and explains why the market should, as
originally crafted under the federal securities laws and sustained through the 1975
Tower Amendment, be limited to regulation through anti-fraud actions.
Part II of this Article provides a bedrock for understanding the municipal
securities market. Part III explores the developing concerns related to the municipal
securities market. Part IV identifies the increased measures that have been taken to
resolve those concerns, specifically the imposition of disclosure obligations on
municipal securities issuers, which violates the Tower Amendment. Part V turns
from problem to solution, proposing that only anti-fraud actions should be used to
regulate the municipal securities market because the municipal securities market
differs from the corporate securities market in five fundamental ways. This Article
then ends with a brief conclusion that echoes the important call for a regulatory
watchdog, rather than a disclosure-dependent megalomaniac, for municipal
securities.
II. The Muni Market
Once considered a “sleepy market,”5 the municipal securities market is now
valued at over $3.67 trillion. 6 The municipal securities market consists of both a
1.

As of the fourth quarter of 2013, approximately $3.67 trillion of municipal bonds were outstanding. BD.

OF GOVERNORS, FED. RESERVE BD., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES – FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS,

INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS tbl. L.211 (2013), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov
/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf.
2. See Rich Smith, How Safe Are Your Muni Bonds? Not Very, Warns Warren Buffett, DAILY FIN. (July 9,
2012, 4:45 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/07/19/warren-buffett-muni-bond-default-crisis-warning/
(discussing California’s bankruptcies).
3. See
Carla
Fried,
Municipal Bonds, Stung Again, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/mutfund/municipal-bonds-stung-again.html?_r=0
(discussing
Detroit’s July 2013 declaration of bankruptcy).
4. See Stephen J. Lubben, Answer to Puerto Rico’s Debt Woes? It’s Complicated, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2014,
2:31 PM), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21588364-heavily-indebted-island-weighsamericas-municipal-bond-market-puerto-pobre (analyzing Puerto Rico’s debt crisis).
5. Christopher Cox, Speech by SEC Chairman: Integrity in the Municipal Market, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (July 18, 2007), available at http:// www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch071807cc.htm.
6. BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 1.
AND
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primary market and a secondary market.7 This Part provides a background of the
municipal securities market by defining municipal securities, identifying the
market’s participants, mapping the market’s regulatory history, and revealing the
problems created by the conception of Rule 15c2-12.
A. What Is A Municipal Security?
The rudimentary definition of a municipal security is the direct debt obligation
issued by a state or local government.8 Beyond that definition, municipal securities,
or “munis”, 9 incorporate an abundant variety of characteristics. These securities
typically diverge in two primary aspects: 1) purpose and 2) form.

1. Purpose
Municipal securities employ varying purposes. In general, municipal securities
provide the necessary financial means for “building and maintaining” our nation’s
infrastructure.10 Government entities issue municipal securities to finance important
public projects, including the construction of schools, hospitals, and highways. 11
Furthermore, the securities are used to meet the everyday financing needs of
municipalities.12

2. Form
Municipal securities come in many forms. A common thread among most
municipal securities is that they are tax-exempt,13 an appealing feature for many
investors. Other features and forms are not so similar. The greatest distinction
involves separating two types of bonds that are classified as either general obligation
bonds or revenue bonds.14 The difference between these two types of bonds deals with
repayment structures. Repayment on general obligation bonds is made from the
issuer’s general tax revenue; thus, the debt is secured by the issuer’s full faith and
credit, along with the government’s taxing power.15 Conversely, revenue bonds are
repaid by revenues generated from the public projects themselves or from special
taxes (sales, gasoline, etc.).16
7. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 1 (2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf [hereinafter MUNICIPAL REPORT].
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(29), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(29) (2006).
9. Investing
Basics:
Municipal
Bonds:
What
Are
Municipal
Bonds?,
INVESTOR.GOV,
http://www.investor.gov/investing-basics/investment-products/municipal-bonds#.VKmqWivF-AV (last visited
Apr. 1, 2015).
10. MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 7.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 11.
14. Id. at 7.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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The securities can also have different maturities.17 Municipal securities that
have maturities of less than one year are typically referred to as municipal “notes.” 18
Conversely, municipal “bonds” typically hold maturities greater than a year. 19
Another distinction comes in the area of interest rates. Interest rates on municipal
securities can either involve a predetermined fixed rate or a variable rate that adjusts
in accordance with market conditions.
In all, several factors determine the overall makeup of municipal securities.
The securities share certain characteristics with corporate securities, but are truly
unique in other respects.
B. Market Participants
An essential ingredient for understanding any market, and how to regulate it,
involves knowing its players. The municipal securities market consists of four core
groups of participants: 1) issuers, 2) underwriters, 3) advisors, and 4) investors.

1. Issuers
It is estimated that there are over “55,000 issuers of municipal securities in
the United States.”20 Towns, cities, counties, and states commonly issue municipal
bonds, but issuers also include a broad span of government entities such as hospitals
and universities.21

2. Underwriters
Along with the issuing governmental entities, underwriters play a vital role in
bringing municipal securities to market. Underwriters act as intermediaries between
the municipal securities issuer and the investors during a primary offering.22 In most
primary offerings, a syndicate—or group of underwriters—purchases the securities
directly from the governmental entity and then resells the securities to
investors.23 These syndicates may consist of large banks or small firms.24 Also, with
each underwriting arrangement, the issuer pays the underwriter a fee for selling the
securities, which is determined on a case-by-case basis with each particular offering.25
17. JUDY WESALO TEMEL, BOND MARKET ASS’N, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 248 (5th ed. 2001).
18. MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., GLOSSARY OF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES TERMS, Note (2d. ed. 2004), available at
http://emma.msrb.org/EducationCenter/Glossary.aspx [hereinafter MSRB GLOSSARY].
19. Id., Bond.
20. How the Market Works, MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., http://www.msrb.org/Municipal-Bond-Market/Howthe-Market-Works.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
21. See Investor Bulletin: Focus on Municipal Bonds, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/municipal.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
22. See MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 15 (discussing the role of the underwriter); see also Securities
Act of 1933 § 2(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11) (2006) (defining “underwriter”).
23. LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GALBADON, SECURITIES REGULATION 26 (5th ed. 2003).
24. Id.
25. MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 15.
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3. Municipal Advisors
Another important player in bringing municipal securities to market is a
municipal advisor. Government issuers will often employ a municipal advisor to
provide counseling services regarding how to structure the issuance. 26 General
financial advisors, consultants, or legal counsel can take on this role of a municipal
advisor. The advisors often assist issuers in determining their financing needs and
may help to determine how to acquire the necessary capital. Advisors may also act as
liaisons in connecting underwriters with the issuers. 27 In some instances, financial
firms may act as both underwriters and municipal advisors for the issuance.28

4. Investors
On the other side of the participant equation are municipal securities
investors. In its early days, institutional investors dominated the municipal
securities market.29 Institutional investors include large banks, pension funds, and
hedge funds.30 However, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 significantly reduced the tax
benefits associated with securities when the securities are purchased by large
institutional investors. 31 As a result, retail investors make up nearly seventy-five
percent of municipal securities investors today.32 Retail investors include individual
“household” investors and small organizations. 33 Thus, several participants play
significant roles in establishing the municipal securities market.
C. Regulatory Background
There are two monumental periods of legislation that shaped the regulatory
background of the municipal securities market: 1) the Securities Act of 1933
(“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”)
(collectively, “Federal Securities Laws”); and 2) the Securities Act Amendments of
1975 (“1975 Amendments”).

26. See Kenneth N. Daniels & Jayaraman Vijayakumar, The Role and Impact of Financial Advisors in the
Market For Municipal Bonds, 30 J. FIN. SERVS. REs. 43, 43 (2006) (“Significantly more and more issuers of
municipal bonds use the services of financial advisors during the bond issuance process.”).
27. TEMEL, supra note 17, at 11.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 150.
30. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION 41 (11th ed. 2009).
31. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 558–
66 (1987), available at http://www.jct.gov/jcs-10-87.pdf.
32. MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 7.
33. MSRB GLOSSARY, supra note 18, Retail Customer.
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1. Federal Securities Laws
The Federal Securities Laws laid the initial regulatory groundwork for the
municipal securities market. When originally enacted, Section 3(a)(2) of the
Securities Act exempted municipal securities and their issuers from registration,
disclosure, and periodic reporting requirements.34 The only federal regulations that
pertained to municipal securities transactions were the Federal Securities Laws’
antifraud provisions—Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5.35 These antifraud provisions prohibit any person from
making a false or misleading statement of material fact, or from omitting any
material fact, in connection with the offer, purchase, or sale of any security—
municipal securities included.36
This “hands off” approach37 to securities regulation was justified for several
economic and policy reasons. First, Congress feared that registration and disclosure
requirements would place undue economic burdens on municipal securities issuers.38
Congress found that certain costs on underwriters, such as capital requirements,
investigatory duties, and other due diligence obligations, would spread to issuers and
hinder their ability to raise capital.39 Similarly, disclosure obligations would cause
issuers to bear increased costs to obtain independent audit reports, legal
representation, or otherwise afford necessary costs of compliance.40
Second, the exemption found credence with policy considerations. 41 The
municipal securities market generally enjoyed high levels of investor confidence. The
market had low rates of default. The market was primarily composed of sophisticated
investors. There was a favorable absence of any evidence of sales or trading abuse
(comparable to that found in the corporate securities markets), and Congress was
especially suspect of possible constitutional problems with imposing federal
regulations on municipalities. 42 Based on these justifications, this regulatory
approach went undisturbed for nearly forty years.

34. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (2006) (“[15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa] shall not apply to . . . [a]ny security issued or
guaranteed by the United States or any territory thereof, or by the District of Columbia, or by any State of the
United States, or by any political subdivision of a State or Territory, or by any public instrumentality of the
Government of the United States pursuant to authority granted by the Congress of the United States.”).
35. See Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b),
§ 15(c), 15 U.S.C §§ 78j(b), 78o(c) (2006); Rules 10b-5, 15c-2, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.15cl-2 (2006).
36. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006).
37 . Ema Clark, The Dodd-Frank Act and Municipal Securities Regulation, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 494,
498 (2011).
38. See Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S.R. 84, S.R.56 & S.R. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Hearings on H.R. 7852 & H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. H.R. REP. NO. 73-8 (1933); Hearings on S. 873 before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
42. Id.
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2. 1975 Amendments
In the early 1970s, the municipal securities market began to increase in both
size and volume of transactions.43 The market began to see increased entries of retail
investors, growing evidence of sale and trading abuses, and a lack of investor
confidence. 44 During this time, the SEC instituted several anti-fraud actions
involving municipal securities dealers.45 Then came the crisis. In March 1975, New
York City nearly defaulted on municipal bonds valued at $600 billion, which would
have been the largest municipal default in history. 46 After this event, Congress
concluded that “[e]xpanding the protections generally available under the federal
securities laws to investors in municipal securities is . . . appropriate.”47
On June 4, 1975, Congress initiated a series of amendments to the Federal
Securities Laws.48 The three most important aspects of these amendments were: a)
the creation of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”); b) new
registration requirements for municipal securities underwriters; and c) the Tower
Amendment.
a. The MSRB
Pursuant to the 1975 Amendments, Congress established the MSRB as the
primary rulemaking authority for the municipal securities marketplace.49 As a selfregulatory organization, the MSRB was charged with establishing rules for those
involved in underwriting, advising, trading, or selling municipal securities.50 Subject
to oversight by the SEC, the MSRB was granted the authority to issue guidance and
create rules establishing fair practices and procedures amongst the participants in
the municipal securities market. However, the MSRB does not have enforcement
power. Instead, Congress divided municipal enforcement responsibilities among
multiple regulatory agencies. 51 Currently, in addition to the SEC, the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) and several banking agencies (e.g., the
FDIC) all play a role in the enforcement of MSRB rules. 52 The MSRB works to
43. See MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 7, at ii (discussing the motivations behind the 1975 Amendments).
44. See id; see also S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 3–4 (1975).
45. OFFICE OF MUN. SEC., U.S. SEC & EXCH. COMM’N, CASES AND MATERIALS 19–23 (1999) available at
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/mbondcs.pdf (summarizing several enforcement actions involving municipal securities
dealers in the late 1970s).
46. Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and Local Government
Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and Opportunities For Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455,
1502 (2013).
47. S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 3 (1975); see also Ann Judith Gellis, Mandatory Disclosure For Municipal Securities:
A Reevaluation, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 15, 17–18 (1987) (“[T]he decision not to require disclosure of information by
municipal issuers went unquestioned [until the New York City bond crisis].”).
48. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 13, 89 Stat. 97, 132 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1) (2006)).
49. See S. REP. NO. 75-94, at 48 (1975).
50. See § 13, 89 Stat. at 132.
51. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15B(c)(5) (1934).
52. See id. § 15B(c)(7).
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facilitate the enforcement efforts of these agencies through regulatory coordination
and enforcement support programs.53
b. Registration Requirements
The 1975 Amendments also created registration requirements for participants
in the secondary market. Firms transacting in municipal securities in the secondary
market were required to register with the SEC as broker-dealers. 54 Additionally,
banks dealing with municipal securities in this market were required to register as
municipal securities dealers. 55 Congress gave the SEC broad rulemaking and
enforcement authority over these broker-dealers and municipal securities dealers.56
Outside of initial registration, however, there were no ongoing disclosure
requirements imposed on these parties.
c. Tower Amendment
A key provision of the 1975 Amendments is the so-called Tower Amendment.
Congress established the Tower Amendment in deference to, and furtherance of, the
disclosure-exempt status of municipal securities as required by Section 3(a)(2) of the
Securities Act.57
The Tower Amendment contains two provisions that expressly restrict federal
regulation pertaining to municipal securities issuers—whether directly or indirectly.
The first provision restricts municipal securities regulation in primary market
issuances:
Neither the [SEC] nor the [MSRB] is authorized under this chapter, by rule or
regulation, to require any issuer of municipal securities, directly or indirectly through
a purchaser or prospective purchaser of securities from the issuer, to file with the
[SEC] or the [MSRB] prior to the sale of such securities by the issuer any application,
report, or document in connection with the issuance, sale, or distribution of such
securities.58

The second provision restricts federal regulation of municipal securities in the
secondary market:
The [MSRB] is not authorized under this chapter to require any issuer of municipal
securities, directly or indirectly through a municipal securities broker, municipal
securities dealer, municipal advisor, or otherwise, to furnish to the [MSRB] or to a
purchaser or a prospective purchaser of such securities any application, report,
53. See MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 34–35.
54. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 13, 89 Stat. 97, 132 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1) (2006)).
55. See id.
56. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 15(c)(1), 15(c)(2); 17(a); 17(b), 15B(c)(1), 21(a)(1).
57. See § 13, 89 Stat. at 132.
58. Id. § 78o-4(d)(1).
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documents, or information with respect to such issuer: Provided, however, that the
[MSRB] may require municipal securities brokers and municipal securities dealers or
municipal advisors to furnish to the [MSRB] or purchasers or prospective purchasers
of municipal securities applications, reports, documents, and information with respect
to the issuer thereof which is generally available from a source other than such issuer.
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to impair or limit the power of the [SEC]
under any provision of this chapter. 59

These provisions of the Tower Amendment clearly illustrated Congress’s approval
and desire to keep municipal securities issuers free from registration and disclosure
requirements. No act of Congress has ever repealed Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities
Act or the Tower Amendment.
D. Rule 15c2-12
With the Tower Amendment in place, the issue of municipal securities
disclosure was not questioned for fourteen years. Then, in 1989, the Washington
Public Power Supply System (“WPPSS”) (which is, ironically, pronounced “whoops”60)
defaulted on $2.25 billion of municipal revenue bonds. 61 Upon investigating this
catastrophe, the SEC developed new concerns about the financial reporting and
disclosure aspects of the municipal securities market.62 But, with Section 3(a)(2) and
the Tower Amendment in the back of their minds, neither Congress nor the SEC
wanted to impose direct disclosure requirements upon municipal securities issuers.
Instead, the SEC decided to target municipal securities and exercised its authority
under Section 15(c)(2) of the Exchange Act, which enables the SEC to adopt rules to
deter fraud and manipulation in the municipal securities market.63 On June 28, 1989,
the SEC adopted Rule 15c2-12.64
When initially adopted, Rule 15c2-12 required underwriters who participated
in primary offerings of municipal securities to obtain, review, and distribute to
investors copies of the issuer’s official statement.65 Official statements are a type of
disclosure document that bear a striking resemblance to a prospectus in the corporate
securities context.66 In connection with Rule 15c2-12, the SEC issued a companion
59. Id. § 78o-4(d)(2).
60. Cox, supra note 5.
61. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (1995); see also Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No.
26,985, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,799 (July 10, 1989) (final rule).
62. See generally DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION IN
THE MATTER OF TRANSACTIONS IN WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM SECURITIES (1988), available at
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f4405e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.com/collection/papers/1980/19
88_0901_SEC_WPPSS.pdf.
63. The SEC adopted Rule 15c2-12 under Section 15(c)(2) of the Exchange Act. Municipal Securities
Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,985, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,799 (July 10, 1989) (final rule).
64. Id.
65. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12 (2012); see also Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No.
26,985, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,799 (July 10, 1989) (final rule).
66. Tesia Nicole Stanley, Narrowing the Disclosure Gap: Is EMMA EDGAR For the Municipal Securities
Market?, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 91, 102 (2010).
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statement that discussed certain due diligence obligations of municipal underwriters
and their responsibility to review the municipal issuer’s official statement.67 As such,
the first makings of municipal securities disclosure obligations took form by way of
this “back-door” primary offering scheme.
In less than five years, the SEC was able to expand its Rule 15c-12 authority
to post-offering disclosures. In 1994, Orange County California declared bankruptcy
after the county lost over $1.5 billion through high-risk investments in bonds. 68
Shortly thereafter, the SEC enacted amendments to Rule 15c2-12. 69 The
amendments prohibited underwriters from participating in a municipal securities
offering unless the underwriter could “reasonably determine” that the issuer would
disclose specified annual information and notices of certain events.70
After this chain of events, the greatest undisclosed truth in the municipal
securities market was that issuers were now subject to disclosure requirements. The
Tower Amendment clearly stated that issuers could not be regulated with disclosure
obligations either directly or indirectly, yet Rule 15c2-12 effectively placed these
burdens on issuers because they could not (practically) sell their securities without
underwriters, and underwriters could not (legally) sell the securities without seeing
disclosure documents from the issuer. However, whatever were the claims of
dichotomy or abuse of authority that could be pegged on the SEC’s creation of Rule
15c2-12, these claims were never asserted because Rule 15c2-12 was never enforced.71
Whether issuers complied with the rule or not, there was never a concern that Rule
15c2-12 held much weight.
III. Regulatory Concerns
This Part discusses the new concerns that have recently eclipsed the municipal
securities market and the bases for increasing the scope and intensity of disclosure
obligations in the market. Within the last five years, the composition and outlook of
the municipal securities market has met unchartered levels of turbulence. In the
wake of a global recession, 72 investment concerns abounded in virtually every
industry. In a CNN interview on December 18, 2009, superstar investment banking
analyst Meredith Whitney enflamed the public’s concerns toward municipal
67. See Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26,100, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,778 (Sept. 22,
1988) (proposing Rule 15c2-12).
68. See generally Report of Investigation in the Matter of County of Orange, California as It Relates to the
Conduct of the Members of the Board of Supervisors, Exchange Act Release No. 36,761 (Jan. 24, 1996), available
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3436761.txt (discussing the potential default of Orange County).
69. Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act. Release No. 34,961, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,590 (Nov. 10, 1994).
70. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.15c2-12 (2012).
71. William C. Rhodes, Teri M. Guarnaccia, & Tesia N. Stanley, SEC Enforcement Division Encourages SelfReporting by Municipal Issuers and Underwriters, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Mar. 11, 2014),
http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2014-03-11-sec-encourages-self-reporting-by-municip
al-securities-issuers-underwriters.aspx.
72. See generally John C. Philo, Local Government Fiscal Emergencies and the Disenfranchisement of
Victims of the Global Recession, 13 J.L. SOC’Y 71 (2011) (discussing the global recession that began in 2007 and
its effect on local governments).
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securities. Whitney said, “There’s not a doubt in my mind that you will see a spate of
municipal-bond defaults. . . . You could see 50 sizable defaults, 50 to 100 sizable
defaults . . . This will amount to hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of defaults.”73
As hindsight would have it, Whitney was wrong. 74 Still, these concerns are not
baseless.
In recent years, increasing problems have been observed in the municipal
securities marketplace, including “pay to play” practices, conflicts of interest, and
overly complex municipal securities instruments.
A. Pay-to-Play Problems
“Pay-to-play” describes a common practice in the municipal securities industry
whereby dealers and underwriters provide political contributions to the campaigns of
elected officials in order to solicit municipal bond business.75 These contributions are
specifically directed to the campaigns of elected officials who will in turn favor those
firms that contributed to them when it is time to select dealers for municipal bond
work. 76 Elected officials involved in the selection of dealers and underwriters
for municipal securities business can range from a local council member to a state
governor.77 These influential contributions can be made to candidates running for an
office or to incumbents already in such offices who are seeking re-election.
Dealers and underwriters personally benefit from the award of municipal bond
business by the fees they generate through underwriting the bonds. These fees can
mean big business in the $3.67 trillion market.78 Therefore, it is understandable that
the system of pay-to-play has historically had an important role in
the municipal securities industry. The practice had become so common that Wall
Street considered these large political contributions to be an ordinary cost of doing
business in the municipal securities industry. 79 Those who did not play the game
risked foregoing valuable municipal bond business, while those who did play were
richly rewarded. 80 Many Wall Street executives condemned the practice but
continued to pay-to-play because they feared that if they did not, then their
competitors who continued to make contributions would have an inside track on the
73. Max Abelson & Michael McDonald, Whitney Municipal-Bond Apocalypse Short on Specifics, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 1, 2011, 10:46 AM), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-01/whitney-municipal-bondapocalypse-is-short-on-default-specifics.html.
74. See, e.g., David Weidner, Meredith Whitney Blew a Call—and Than Some, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 27, 2012,
1:53 PM), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444549204578021380172883800.
75. See Stephen J. Hedges & Warren Cohen, The Politics of Money: How Underwriters of Municipal Bonds
Win
Their
Business, U.S.
NEWS
&
WORLD
REP.
(Sep.
20,
1993),
available
at
http://wjcohen.home.mindspring.com/usnclips/money.htm.
76. Id.
77. See Jerry Knight, Cracking the “Club” That Controls the Muni Bond Market, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1993,
at H1.
78. See BD. OF GOVERNORS, supra note 1.
79. See Hedges & Cohen, supra note 75.
80. See Jube Shiver, Jr., Big Muni Bond Firms Agree to Curb Political Contributions, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19,
1993, at D1.
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municipal bond business. 81 Moreover, some Wall Street underwriters, who
complained about the system in private, did not dare complain about it to federal
officials out of fear that government issuers would blacklist them.82
B. Other Conflicts of Interest
The pay-to-play practice is one type of concern regarding potential conflicts of
interest between elected officials and dealers and underwriters. Regulators have also
been increasingly suspect of the influence that municipal advisors have on issuers
and the amount of fees earned from arranging bond issuances. The importance of
bond counsel is crucial in the municipal securities market because they assist
issuers—government officials who may or may not have any financial competency—
in the structuring of deals, thereby increasing the likelihood of a successful project.
However, conflicts of interest arise when the advisors are not independent, and are
somehow connected to the dealers or underwriters, therefore, having an incentive to
manipulate the fees paid by issuers to the dealers or underwriters.83 For instance, “a
municipal advisor might advise an issuer to structure an offering in a particular way,”
even though that structure is not in the issuer’s best interest because “the financial
advisor may receive payments from a third party, such as the provider of a swap or
guaranteed investment contract.”84
Issues also arise in certain swap transactions. In these situations, the
municipal advisor’s pecuniary interest is dependent upon concluding the swap
agreement.85 Therefore, these arrangements may improperly incentivize municipal
advisors to emphasize the benefits of the swaps and minimize their risks so that they
can get the municipal security out the door as soon as possible.
C. Complex Instruments
Additional concerns have arisen regarding the growing complexity of
municipal securities and whether municipal advisors sufficiently understand, and
are qualified to advise, on these products. Historically, municipal securities were

81. Id.
82. Constance Mitchell & Thomas T. Vogel, Jr., Illegal Payments Mar the Muni Market, WALL ST. J., May 5,
1993, at C1.
83. Tamar Frankel, “Let Me Advise You How Much to Pay Me”: Subverting Fiduciary Duties and Rules , 28
MUN. FIN. J. 53, 54–55 (2007).
84. See Martha Mahan Haines, Testimony Concerning Legislative Proposals to Improve the Efficiency and
Oversight of Municipal Finance, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May 21, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts052109mmh.htm.
85. See PA. DEP’T OF THE AUDITOR GEN., A SPECIAL INVESTIGATION OF THE BETHLEHEM AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT,
LEHIGH/NORTHAMPTON COUNTIES: A CASE STUDY OF THE USE OF QUALIFIED INTEREST RATE MANAGEMENT
AGREEMENTS (“SWAPS”) BY LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS IN PENNSYLVANIA, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS 42–43 (2009),
available at http://www.auditorgen.state.pa.us/Media/Default/Reports/invBASD111809.pdf (relating conclusions
and recommendations regarding deceptive tactics of market advisors).
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benign and basic. 86 Today, municipal securities can take the form of complex
derivatives and other instruments that are incomprehensible to even highly trained
investment advisors. 87 Specifically, regulators have grown increasingly concerned
about the role of unregulated advisors in the sale of derivative products to
municipalities, particularly interest rate swaps. 88 “[D]erivative products carry
numerous embedded risks that may not be easily understood by less financially
sophisticated issuers. Some such risks are interest rate risk, termination risk, and
counterparty risk.”89 Even “[m]any sophisticated issuers face large swap termination
fees due to changes in short-term interest rates.”90 These developing intricacies and
convoluted structures open the door to abuse because problems with the securities
may not be detectable, let alone understood. Each of the concerns raised in this
section have the potential to lead to bankruptcy or risks of default for municipal
securities issuers.
IV. Tearing Down the Tower
This Part discusses regulators’ newfound appetite to impose regulatory
burdens on the municipal securities market. The aftermath of the 2008-2009 global
financial crisis and subsequent developing concerns associated with municipal
securities have led regulators to zone in on the municipal securities market. Since
2009, there have been unprecedented amounts of regulatory movement focused on
reforming the municipal marketplace. The most prevalent among these actions have
been new regulations, increased oversight, and heightened enforcement.
A. New Disclosure Regulations
There have been several new regulations that have recently come into
existence that require municipal securities issuers to provide disclosures to the SEC
and the MSRB. The three most important regulations are: 1) the creation of the
Electronic Municipal Market Access system (“EMMA”); 2) an amendment to Rule
15c2-12 requiring special event disclosures; and 3) the registration requirements for
municipal advisors pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protect Act (“Dodd-Frank”).

86. See MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 91–95 (discussing how municipal securities have interacted with,
and been affected by, derivatives and swaps).
87. See id.
88. See Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets - Part II: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 178-79 (2009) (statement of Ronald A. Stack,
Chair, MSRB), available at http:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg144/pdf/CHRG-111shrg144.pdf.
89. Id. at 178.
90. Id.
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1. EMMA
On July 1, 2009, the SEC effected a new rule requiring municipal securities
underwriters to “reasonably determine” that the municipal securities issuer provided
disclosure documents to the MSRB by way of EMMA.91 This rule’s bottom line is that
EMMA would be the sole repository for initial and continuing disclosure documents.
In other words, EMMA became the equivalent of EDGAR92 in the corporate securities
marketplace—a standardized disclosure system that provides easy access to issuers’
filings for investors and regulators alike.

2. Special Event Disclosures
In May 2010, the SEC adopted additional amendments to Rule 15c-12
requiring municipal securities dealers to provide special-event disclosures.93 These
amendments also eliminated the existing materiality requirements for certain
reportable events.94 The amendments expanded the number and type of reportable
events95 and imposed new time limits for reporting events.96 The amendments also
revised (and almost entirely eliminated) an exemption from Rule 15c2-12’s continuing
disclosure requirements for certain municipal securities, such as those with put
features.97 The SEC, in conjunction with these amendments, issued an interpretive
guidance, which reminded underwriters of their obligations under the antifraud
provisions, particularly in cases where a municipal issuer failed to comply with
agreements to provide continuing disclosure documents.98 The interpretive guidance
also reminded issuers that they are “primarily responsible for the content of their
disclosure documents, and may be held liable under the federal securities laws for
misleading disclosure.”99
Commenting on these developments, the SEC’s staff has expressed the view
that the SEC had reached the outer edges of its rule-making authority under Rule
15c2-12.100 Still, the edges of authority seem to be continually expanding.

91. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, IMPACT OF RECENT AMENDMENTS TO RULE 15C2-12 AND APPROVAL OF MSRB’S
EMMA SYSTEM 1 http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/rule15c2_12.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
92. See generally Stanley, supra note 66 (comparing EMMA and EDGAR).
93. See Amendment to Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-62184A, 75 Fed. Reg.
33,100 (May 26, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-12).
94. Id. at 33,103.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 33,131.
97. Id. at 33,100.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Press Release, Disclosure and Accounting Practices in the Municipal Securities Market , U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 3-4 (2007), available at http:// www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-148wp.pdf.
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3. The Dodd-Frank Act
On October 1, 2012, Section 975 of Dodd-Frank became effective. 101 This
section required municipal advisors to register with the SEC. Immediately following
the passage of Dodd-Frank, the SEC adopted an interim rule to temporarily satisfy
this requirement and created final rules for the requirement on September 23,
2013.102 In January 2014, the SEC issued a stay on the final rule until July 2014.
The reason for the stay was to provide additional time for market participants to
address a number of issues regarding implementation of, and compliance with, the
new rule.103 The rule would require many participants to adapt their policies and
procedures, develop supervisory practices and internal controls, adapt account and
investment tracking systems, develop recordkeeping procedures, adapt business
models and practices, educate personnel with respect to the new rule, and develop
training programs to establish effective compliance with the rule.104
Additionally, Dodd-Frank significantly expanded the authority of the MSRB,
allowing the MSRB to adopt rules regulating transactions in municipal securities by
broker-dealers and municipal securities dealers.105 Dodd-Frank enabled the MSRB
to provide advice to, or on behalf of, municipal entities and their intermediaries, along
with other municipal advisors106 with respect to municipal financial products107 or
the issuance of municipal securities. Pursuant to the proposed SEC rule, the MSRB
was also granted authority to solicit certain business on behalf of broker-dealers,
municipal securities dealers, and municipal advisors from municipal entities and
obligated persons.108 Dodd-Frank also changed the composition of the membership on
the MSRB to require a majority of public representatives.109
In sum, Dodd-Frank called for “the MSRB to write rules to regulate the
advisers, but [the MSRB] can’t do so until the SEC establishes who counts as a
municipal adviser.”110 In effect, then, this new rule will allow the MSRB to impose
any disclosure obligations on these parties.

101. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376,
§ 975 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
102. Temporary Registration of Municipal Advisors, Exchange Act Release No. 62824, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,465
(Sept. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249).
103. Temporary Stay on Final Rule on Registration of Municipal Advisors, Exchange Act Release No. 3471288, 79 Fed. Reg. 2,777 (Jan. 13, 2014).
104. See e.g., letter from Mike Nicholas, CEO, Bond Dealers of America, to Hon. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, (Nov. 8, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-45-10/s74510-977.pdf.
105. MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 33–35.
106. 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Liz Farmer, What Will the New Bosses at the SEC and MSRB Mean for Muni Bonds?, GOVERNING (June
2013), http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-new-bosses-sec-msrb-effects-on-muni-bonds-market.html.
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B. Increased Oversight
The amount of oversight in the municipal securities marketplace has increased
in the last five years. The three most important changes in this realm are: 1) the
creation of the Municipal Securities and Public Pensions unit (“MSPP”); 2) a new SEC
enforcement division called the Office of Municipal Securities (“OMS”); and (3) the
introduction of the Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Initiative (“Initiative”).

1. Municipal Securities and Public Pensions Unit
On January 13, 2010, the SEC announced the appointment of the MSPP.111
This new “specialized unit” was created to target misconduct in the municipal
securities market, with a specific focus on public pension funds. A specific mandate
of the unit was to target “offering and disclosure fraud.”112 The MSPP has brought
actions against bulge-bracket banks such as Goldman Sachs and Bank of America,
and has also been involved in the cases “against the states of Illinois and New Jersey
and the cities of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; South Miami, Florida; and Miami,
Florida.”113

2. Office of Municipal Securities
In 2012, the SEC established the OMS as required by Dodd-Frank.114 The OMS
works to educate municipal securities issuers about risk management issues and SEC
policies.115 Additionally, the OMS “reviews and processes rule filings created by [the
MSRB] and acts as the SEC’s liaison with the [MSRB], FINRA, and a variety of
industry groups on municipal securities issues.”116 The OMS director, John Cross,
has emphasized that a key mission of the OMS is to increase disclosure obligations
in the municipal securities market.117

William F. Sullivan, Thomas A. Zaccarro, Morgan J. Miller, & Adam D. Schneir, SEC Unveils Specialized
and New Cooperation Standards, PAULHASTINGS.COM 1 (Jan. 2010), available at
http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/1485.pdf.
112. Id.
113. Deede Weithorn, State and Local Governments Face Tougher Enforcement of Federal Securities and
Pension Regulations, BERKOWITZ POLLACK BRANT (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.bpbcpa.com/litigation-support/stateand-local-governments-face-tougher-enforcement-of-federal-securities-and-pension-regulations-by-deede-weitho
rn/.
114. See Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act Will Impact Municipal Securities Market , MCGUIRE WOODS
CONSULTING (July 22, 2010), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/Client-Resources/Alerts/2010/7/Dodd-FrankFinancial-Reform-Act-Will-Impact-Municipal-Securities-Market.aspx.
115. Office of Municipal Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/municipal#.U2QZ6q1dUs8
(last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
116. Id.
117. Farmer, supra note 110.
111.

Units
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3. Self-Reporting Disclosure Violations
On March 10, 2014, the SEC announced the new “cooperation” Initiative.118
The Initiative encourages municipal securities issuers to self-report Rule 15c2-12
disclosure violations to the SEC. According to the Initiative, the SEC will recommend
“favorable settlement terms” to issuers if they self-report any violations involving
materially inaccurate statements relating to “prior compliance with the continuing
disclosure obligations specified in Rule 15c2-12.”119 While not strictly an oversight
committee, the Initiative displays the SEC’s paternalistic approach to the municipal
securities market.
C. Heightened Enforcement
“Before 2013, despite reports of widespread issuer noncompliance with . . .
disclosure obligations, the SEC had not brought a related enforcement action against
an issuer or emphasized SEC Rule 15c2-12 in its enforcement actions against
underwriters.” 120 Two cases brought in 2013 reveal the SEC’s new enforcement
ideologies with respect to Rule 15c2-12 and municipal securities issuers: 1) West
Clark, and 2) Wenatchee.

1. West Clark
In July 2013, the SEC set groundbreaking precedent by undertaking an
enforcement action against Indiana’s West Clark Community Schools District of
Clark County, Indiana (“West Clark”) and the school district’s underwriter. 121 In
December 2007, West Clark issued a $31 million municipal bond offering. 122 In its
offering statement, the district affirmatively stated that it was in compliance with all
continuing disclosure obligations related to its previous bond offerings.123 The SEC
found, however, that in March 2005, West Clark had issued a $52 million bond
offering but had failed to file any initial disclosures, ongoing annual reports, or any
notice of its failures to do so.124
In its 2007 bond offering, under the section titled “Compliance with Previous
Undertakings” of its official statement, West Clark stated that it had “never failed to
comply” with any disclosure obligations from its past offerings.125 The SEC found that
118. See Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation Initiative, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/municipalities-continuing-disclosure-cooperation-initiative.shtml
(last
visited Apr. 1, 2015).
119. Id.
120. Rhodes, Guarnaccia, & Stanley, supra note 71.
121. Press Release, SEC Charges School District and Muni Bond Underwriter in Indiana with Defrauding
Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 29, 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail
/PressRelease/1370539734122#.U2RDja1dUs8.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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West Clark, including its school board president, had reviewed, approved, and
authorized this disclosure. 126 Accordingly, the SEC charged West Clark with
securities fraud on the basis of material misstatements in its official statement,
stating that it “knew, or was reckless in not knowing,” that it never made any of the
required continuing disclosures.127
The terms upon which the case was settled between the SEC and West Clark
reveal how the SEC treats an issuer’s failure to disclose. The settlement required
West Clark to ensure that it would provide timely and accurate disclosures in the
future, that it would implement internal trainings for all personnel involved in the
disclosure process, and that it would certify these trainings with the SEC.128

2. Wenatchee
The West Clark case does not stand alone. In November 2003, the SEC charged
the Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public Facilities District
(“Wenatchee”) “with misleading investors in a bond offering that financed the
construction of a regional events center and ice hockey arena.”129 The SEC claimed
that the issuer negligently misled investors because it failed to disclose certain
information in its official statement.130 Wenatchee stated that there had never been
independent reviews of its financial projections, and the SEC found this statement to
be false.131 The SEC also found that Wenatchee had failed to inform investors that
the city of Wenatchee’s mayor had unduly influenced the financial projections. 132
Based on these actions, the SEC assessed a financial penalty against Wenatchee,
marking the first case in history that the SEC assessed a financial penalty against a
municipal securities issuer.133
The West Clark case and the Wenatchee case demonstrate that the SEC is now
willing to utilize its enforcement power in failure to disclose cases—despite the Tower
Amendment or any act of Congress that enables this power.
V. Proposal
Again, the greatest undisclosed truth in the municipal securities market is that
municipal issuers are subject to disclosure requirements. Whatever uncertainties to
this fact existed with the initial arrival of Rule 15c2-12—cloaked with a focus on
underwriters rather than issuers—the events over the past five years have left no
doubt as to this fact. The disclosure requirements in the municipal securities
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Press Release, SEC Charges Municipal Issuer in Washington’s Wenatchee Valley Region For Misleading
Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 5, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/
PressRelease/1370540262235#.U2J-SK1dUs8.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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marketplace now mirror those of its corporate counterpart—official statements,
periodical reporting, special event disclosures, a centralized filing repository—there
is virtually no difference between the two markets. While the presentation of this
Article suggests that disclosure obligations have gotten out of hand, the reality—
established by the Tower Amendment—is that they never should have existed in the
first place. Therefore, the ultimate issue in this Article is not whether these disclosure
obligations exist, but whether they should exist. This Article’s answer to that issue is
a resounding “no”.
Regulation of the municipal securities market should be limited to the only
congressionally approved regulatory devices: anti-fraud actions. The attempt to
regulate the municipal securities market with the same disclosure devices as the
corporate securities market creates undue burdens on the market. These burdens are
undue because the municipal securities market differs from the corporate securities
market in five primary aspects: (i) the market has lower default rates; (ii) there is a
lack of proven abuses in issuing municipal securities, and the anti-fraud provisions
adequately handle those abuses; (iii) municipal securities investors are different, if
not more sophisticated; (iv) there is uncertainty whether a constitutional basis exists
for the federal regulation of state and local governments; and (v) increased disclosure
costs fall on taxpayers, rather than shareholders.
A. Safer Bets
Defaults on municipal bonds are rare. Even the riskiest municipal bonds have
extremely low default rates—lower on average than AAA-rated corporate bonds.134
“Municipal securities are considered to be second only to Treasuries in risk level as
an investment instrument.” 135 In 2013, the most recent year reported, Moody’s
concluded that the default rate for investment grade municipal debt was .03%,
compared to 1.4% for investment grade corporate debt. 136 This data means that
corporate debt is 46.67 times more likely to default than municipal debt. Moreover,
the ultimate recovery for municipal bonds was just under 64% for the period 19702013, compared to 43.8% for corporate senior bonds over the same period.137 Director
of the SEC’s new Office of Municipal Securities, John Cross, admitted, “Many would
134. See MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., MAPPING OF MOODY’S U.S. MUNICIPAL BOND RATING SCALE TO MOODY’S
CORPORATE RATING SCALE AND ASSIGNMENT OF CORPORATE EQUIVALENT RATINGS TO MUNICIPAL OBLIGATIONS 2
(2006), available at https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBM_PBM97921.
135. 2014 FACTS: STATE AND MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY, MUNICIPAL BONDS, STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS, GOVN’T
FINANCE OFFICERS ASS’N 2, available at http://www.nasra.org/files/JointPublications/FactsYouShouldKnow.pdf
(last visited Dec. 31, 2014).
136. Compare MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., SPECIAL COMMENT: US MUNICIPAL BOND DEFAULTS AND RECOVERIES,
1970–2013 1 (May 7, 2014) available at https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=
PBM_PBM170048 [hereinafter SPECIAL COMMENT: US MUNICIPAL BOND DEFAULTS], with MOODY’S INVESTORS
SERVICES, SPECIAL COMMENT: ANNUAL DEFAULT STUDY: CORPORATE DEFAULT AND RECOVERY RATES, 1920–2013 1
(Feb. 28, 2014), available at https://www.moodys.com/researchdocumentcontentpage.aspx?docid=PBC_165331
[hereinafter SPECIAL COMMENT: ANNUAL DEFAULT STUDY].
137. Compare SPECIAL COMMENT: US MUNICIPAL BOND DEFAULTS, supra note 136, with SPECIAL COMMENT:
ANNUAL DEFAULT STUDY, supra note 136, at 2.
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say, ‘There’s nothing broken here. What are you trying to fix?’ And there’s some truth
to that,” noting that defaults have been limited mostly to small sectors of the
market.138
In terms of outlook, Anne Van Praagh, a Moody’s Managing Director said,
“Even recently increased default activity remains well within levels predicted by our
present municipal rating distributions . . . [and] risks are tilted to the downside going
forward.”139
Low rates of default were an important justification for exempting municipal
securities from registration and reporting requirements with the passage of Section
3(a)(2) and the Tower Amendment.140 Given the proof that the municipal securities
still substantially differ from corporate securities in this aspect, this justification
should remain in effect today.
B. Lack of Abuse
In general, the municipal securities market has a relatively low level of
abuse. 141 Moreover, the Tower Amendment does not prohibit the SEC
from regulating the municipal securities market through antifraud provisions, and
the MSRB has the authority to define what activities are subject to those provisions.
In this respect, the MSRB has been able to create rules, outside the disclosure
context, that specifically deal with the regulatory concerns discussed in Part III. For
example, the MSRB’s Rule G-37 provides the SEC with enforcement authority where
there have been pay-to-play violations. 142 Similarly, the SEC, FINRA, and other
regulatory bodies have authority under the MSRB rules to target conflicts of interest
and issues with unqualified municipal advisors.143
Over the last ten years, the SEC has increasingly exercised this authority and
has issued many enforcement actions to regulate the conduct of issuers, bond counsel,
and other market participants.144 The following three cases show that the anti-fraud
provisions sufficiently capture any wrongdoing that does exist: 1) Harrisburg; 2)
South Miami; and 3) Victorville.

Farmer, supra note 110.
Global Credit Res., Announcement: Municipal Bond Defaults have Increased since Financial Crisis, But
Numbers Remain Low, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., INC. (May 7, 2013), https://www.moodys.com/research/MoodysMunicipal-bond-defaults-have-increased-since-financial-crisis-but--PR_272561.
140. H.R. REP. NO. 73-8 (1933); Hearings on S. 873 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
141. S. REP. NO. 94-75 (1975); see also Chung, supra note 46, at 1501 (discussing the lack of abuse).
142. MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 102.
143. Id. at 43.
144. See id. at 31.
138.
139.
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1. Harrisburg
On May 6, 2013, the SEC charged the city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania with
securities fraud.145 The SEC found that, from 2007 to 2011, the city made material
misstatements and omissions in several non-disclosure filings, such as the 2009 city
budget, State of the City address, and mid-year fiscal report. 146 According to the
SEC’s order, Harrisburg was nearly bankrupt and under state receivership mainly
because of a $260 million revenue bond for an energy facility.147 In 2008, Moody’s
downgraded the city’s general obligation bonds to a Baa1 rating, citing Harrisburg’s
guarantee of the energy facility’s bond as the primary reason. 148 Despite this
downgrade, Harrisburg stated in its 2009 budget, and on the city’s website that its
general obligation bonds were still being rated AAA.149
The SEC also found that Harrisburg’s Comprehensive Annual Financial
Report (“CAFR”) for the year 2007, which was not filed on EMMA until late 2009,
omitted $4 million in guarantee payments that the city had paid on the energy facility
bond.150 Accordingly, the SEC charged Harrisburg with Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
anti-fraud violations.151 Significantly, the violating statements were not made in the
city’s formal disclosure filings, but in general public statements and reports.

2. South Miami
On May 22, 2013, the SEC charged the city of South Miami, Florida with
defrauding investors with false claims of tax exemptions for its bonds.152 The city had
issued a bond to construct a parking structure in its downtown commercial district.153
The structure included both a parking facility (that would be financed by the bond)
and a private retail facility. 154 The SEC found that in 2002 and 2006, the city
borrowed over $12 million in two conduit bond offerings through the Florida
Municipal Loan Council (“FMLC”), which enabled the city to borrow the funds at
advantageous tax-exempt rates.155
The SEC found that a municipal advisor had warned city officials that the taxexempt status of the bonds would be lost if any of the bond proceeds were used to
145. Press Release, SEC Charges City of Harrisburg For Fraudulent Public Statements, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N (Mar. 6, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171514194#.
U2RKjK1dUs8.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Press Release, SEC Charges City of South Miami with Defrauding Investors About Tax-Exempt Status
of
Municipal
Bonds,
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N
(May
22,
2013),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171514424#.U2RNaq1dUs8.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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finance the retail portion of the structure.156 The SEC also found that although city
officials at the time understood this constraint, subsequent city officials were
unaware of counsel’s advice.157 Therefore, when the city revised the lease with the
developer in 2005 to give the developer primary control over the entire project—both
the retail portion and the public parking garage—the tax-exempt status of the bonds
was lost.158
In 2006, the city sought to raise an additional $5.5 million to complete the
garage project, but it still did not disclose to the FMLC that it had significantly
revised the project lease or that it had lent the developer the $2.5 million from the
proceeds of the 2002 bond offering. 159 The SEC found that, in several documents
submitted to the FMLC, South Miami misrepresented that its participation in the
2006 bond offering complied with the requirements for the exemption and FMLC,
relying on the city’s representations, incorrectly offered and sold the 2006 bonds as
exempt from federal income tax.160 The SEC charged South Miami with fraud under
Section 17(a) and reached a settlement with the city that cost the beach town nearly
$1.4 million.161

3. Victorville
On April 29, 2013, the SEC charged the city of Victorville, California and its
bond underwriter with securities fraud based on improper valuations, conflicts of
interest, and unauthorized fees. 162 The SEC found that the city had inflated its
valuations on a municipal bond offering in April 2008. The SEC charged the bond
underwriter with misappropriating more than $2.7 million in bond proceeds that
were used to “keep [the underwriter] afloat.”163 The SEC also found that $450,000 of
the underwriter’s fees were not justified.164
C. Different Investor
Although retail investors hold seventy-five percent of municipal securities,
these are not the same investors that hold corporate securities. A predominant
portion of retail investors in the municipal marketplace “buy and hold” the securities
until maturity.165 “About 99% of outstanding municipal securities do not trade on any
156.
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given day.” 166 “While trading is most active in newly issued bonds, it declines
significantly as time passes. For example, only 15% of municipal securities trade in
the second month after issuance.”167 In other words, municipal market investors are
not concerned with real-time information, or essentially any ongoing reports, because
they are not actively trading the securities. “Further . . . 25% of the outstanding
principal amount is held on behalf of individual investors by mutual, money market,
closed-end, and exchange-traded funds.”168 This signifies that while retail investors
fund the investments, they do not manage the investments themselves, but rely on
the sophistication of investment managers.
D. Federalism
Issues of intergovernmental comity and financial federalism have hovered over
the federal regulation of state and local authorities since the inception of the
Securities Act.169 The explanation for this is “recognition of the fact that municipal
issuers are themselves U.S. sovereigns.” 170 While this is true, the Constitution’s
Commerce Clause permits the federal government to regulate interstate
commerce. 171 The Commerce Clause has received great deference from the U.S.
Supreme Court, and already encompasses the selling of corporate securities that pass
through state lines.172 Still, it is not clear if courts would uphold an act of Congress
that creates a federal regulation imposing direct disclosure obligations on municipal
issuers.
States themselves may challenge the validity of these federal regulations. For
example, Texas recently passed a law enabling the state to avoid following the rules
of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”), a federally backed
source of accounting principles used by United States municipalities.173 Connecticut
has also considered taking the same action. 174 This shows that states may defy
federal standards on the basis of sovereignty.

166. Elisse B. Walter, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Brining Municipal Bond Trading into the Light, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 1, 2012), available at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171491
308#.U2KL_61dUs8.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Financial Federalism and the Short, Happy Life of Municipal Securities
Regulation, 34 J. CORP. L. 739, 753–55 (2009) (discussing the federalism issues with federal regulation of
municipal securities issuers).
170. Cox, supra note 5.
171. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
172. See Securities Act of 1933, § 5(1), 48 Stat. 74, 87 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2006)).
173. Mission, Vision, and Core Values, GOVERNMENTAL ACCT. STANDARDS BD., http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/
Page/GASBSectionPage&cid=1175804850352 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); see also Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r,
Remarks at Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board’s 1st Annual Municipal Securities Regulator Summit , U.S.
SEC & EXCH. COMM. (May 29, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541936387
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174. See Marie Leone, Will Connecticut Swallow GAAP Whole?, CFO.COM (June 19, 2007),
http://ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/2007/06/will-connecticut-swallow-gaap-whole/.
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E. Who Pays
Perhaps the most important issue in regulating the municipal securities
market with disclosure rules—one that has received little attention by scholars and
regulators alike—involves who the additional disclosure costs fall on. In the corporate
realm, increased disclosure costs ultimately fall on the corporation’s shareholders. 175
In contrast, increased compliance costs with municipal securities bleed to taxpayers.
While the taxpayers may have an interest in the public project, this is not a sufficient
rationale for why they should bear the costs. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox justified
placing increased disclosure costs on taxpayers with this statement, “I suppose you
could make the argument that municipal issuers are merely saving taxpayer dollars
by not having to pay the auditor for additional procedures. You could also save a
bundle on pre-surgery medical evaluation by relying on last year’s MRI. Personally,
I’d like to know the recent findings, and whether something has changed.” 176
However, his statement only demonstrates the reality that investors may want
increased disclosure, but taxpayers are the ones fitting the bill for these disclosures.
This factor unveils a crucial discord between the municipal securities and corporate
securities markets.
Summarily, the foregoing differences between the municipal and corporate
marketplaces demonstrate the incompatibility of a standardized, disclosure-based
method of regulating municipal securities. Congress got it right in 1933, and again in
1975—municipal securities issuers should only be regulated by anti-fraud actions.
VI. Conclusion
This Article has examined the fundamental discord between regulating the
municipal securities market with the same structure and intensity as the corporate
securities market. This Article has proposed limiting the reach of federal regulatory
bodies on the municipal securities market because of the harmful impacts had by
overreaching regulation. To address these harms, this Article has ultimately
suggested that registration and disclosure requirements place undue burdens on
municipal entities and their counterparts, and that regulatory bodies should only
focus their control on municipal securities through enforcement actions.
There are several ways to achieve this result of deregulation. Any litigant could
raise an action against the SEC under the Administration Procedure Act for
overstepping its authority with the creation of Rule 15c2-12, Congress could get
involved and reinforce the Tower Amendment, courts could invalidate SEC failure to
disclose actions, or states could take the Texas approach and create contradicting
state laws. However it is done, it is time to set municipal securities issuers free from
disclosure bondage.
175. See Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability For Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS.
L. REV. 297, 317–18 (2009).
176. Cox, supra note 5.
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